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1. INTRODUCTION
All industrial plants undergo changes over time, and
nuclear plants are no exception. The CANDU 6 reactor
follows earlier CANDU designs such as NPD (Nuclear
Power Demonstration), Douglas Point, Pickering A, and
Bruce A. As such, certain aspects of plant aging were
addressed directly in the design process. This was reflected
in the selection of the materials, design allowances and
provisions, and operating margins. In addition, certain
maintenance practices have been developed over time at
the stations to address the aging issues. In terms of Special
Safety System availability, Reliability Studies were per-
formed to determine the required tests and frequency of
testing to ensure that necessary targets were achieved.
Nonetheless, it was not possible to precisely predict how
the plants would change over time at the design stage. To
ensure that such changes would not compromise public
safety, programs were developed to provide a continued
assurance of Nuclear Station Safety.
These programs are based on the principles of moni-
toring/detecting, anticipating, understanding and then
correcting or compensating. It has components involving
Research and Development (R&D), analysis and assessment,
maintenance, operational changes, and design modifications.
This paper deals with the investigation of the aging
behavior of the heat transport system (HTS) for an older
CANDU 6 plant as well as newer, improved plants and
its potential impact on safety systems including the per-
formance of channel flows and Critical Channel Power
(CCP), one of the major components in the Regional
Overpower Protection (ROP) system. This safety system
protects against slow Loss of Regulation (LOR) accidents.
This paper further explores, in greater detail, post-CCP
aging safety analysis methodology for a fresh core and an
11 EFPY aged core for the case of a postulated feeder
stagnation break, and specifically includes fuel failure and
the fission gas release during an accident transient which
plays a major role in determining possible radiation doses
to the public after postulated accidents have occurred.
This paper deals with the Safety Analysis for CANDU® 6 nuclear reactors as affected by main Heat Transport System
(HTS) aging. Operational and aging related changes of the HTS throughout its lifetime may lead to restrictions in certain
safety system settings and hence some restriction in performance under certain conditions. A step in confirming safe reactor
operation is the tracking of relevant data and their corresponding interpretation by the use of appropriate thermal-hydraulic
analytic models. Safety analyses ranging from the assessment of safety limits associated with the prevention of intermittent
fuel sheath dryout for a slow Loss of Regulation (LOR) analysis and fission gas release after a fuel failure are summarized.
Specifically for fission gas release, the thermal-hydraulic analysis for a fresh core and an 11 Effective Full Power Years
(EFPY) aged core was summarized, leading to the most severe stagnation break sizes for the inlet feeder break and the channel
failure time. Associated coolant conditions provide the input data for fuel analyses. Based on the thermal-hydraulic data, the
fission product inventory under normal operating conditions may be calculated for both fresh and aged cores, and the fission
gas release may be evaluated during the transient. This analysis plays a major role in determining possible radiation doses to
the public after postulated accidents have occurred.
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2. CANDU 6 MAIN HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM
AGING 
Fig. 1 gives a simplified presentation of the HTS com-
ponents and coolant flow of a typical CANDU 6 reactor.
The HTS consists of two “figure-of-8 loops” with four
main HTS pumps (P1, P2, P3, P4), four Steam Generators
(SG) (B1, B2, B3, B4), and associated headers (HD) ser-
vicing the 380 reactor-core channels (ranging from channels
A09 to W14). Each HTS loop consists of two HTS passes.
The outlet header, purification and pressurizer interfaces
are also shown.
Operational preferences as well as aging processes
may cause changes to the primary HTS. These changes
affect both the coolant-flow and heat transfer properties
of the HTS as a whole. There are several contributing
effects, some acting to increase and some to decrease the
safety margins. The magnitudes of these effects vary over
time, and thus the overall impact on the HTS is a complex
integrated function of all mechanisms.
Operational changes can take place in a relatively short
time frame, such as changes caused by utility operating
preferences as well as changes in the reference analytical
model interpretation caused by measurement-instrumen-
tation calibration.
Aging related changes typically take place over rela-
tively long time periods. The following is a list of the main
known aging processes that may occur within the HTS
that can influence the CCP:
• Increase in Pressure Tube (PT) diameter owing to
irradiation creep (PT diametral creep): This reduces
the hydraulic resistance in the channel, and hence
increases its coolant-flow, but causes a redistribution
of coolant flow within the bundle that can result in a
reduction in dryout power. Because there is more
creep in the higher power channels, there is a flow
redistribution effect whereby some of the flow from
the outer low power channels is redirected to the inner
channels. Increased flow in the central channels
mitigates the effect of PT diametral creep on the CCP
for the central most important, high-power channels. 
• Increase in hydraulic resistance owing to a redistri-
bution of iron oxides (magnetite) in the HTS: Disso-
lution of iron and Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)
has been shown to occur in CANDU 6 plants. Iron is
removed from the outlet feeders and is re-deposited
in the cooler parts of the circuit, including the cold leg
of the steam generators, the inlet feeders, and possibly
the first section of the fuel channels. The magnetite
layers cause both a fouling of the inside of the steam
generator tubes, leading to reduced heat transfer, and
also an increase in hydraulic resistance in the steam
generator tubes and inlet feeders. This affects the core
flow (possibly also the core top-to-bottom flow tilt),
inlet header temperature, and consequently, the CCP. 
• Erosion of the edges of flow-reducing orifices: This
leads to relative flow redistribution from the inner
to the outer parts of the reactor core.
Considerable advances have been made to mitigate
these aging characteristics, by making both design and
operational changes. 
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Fig. 1. CANDU 6 Simplified HTS Flow Diagram
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3. SITE MEASUREMENTS FOR REACTOR
PERFORMANCE TRACKING AND HTS MODEL
DEVELOPMENT
CANDU 6 plants keep track of key measurable param-
eters as a means of tracking the aging of the plant, and make
adjustments as appropriate. Typical site data measurements
include inlet header temperature, header-to-header differ-
ential pressure, outlet header pressure, pump suction pres-
sure, coolant flow rate, and PT diametral creep. Some of
the aging trends associated with these parameters are
captured in Figs. 2, 3, and 4 for the original design while
Figs. 5, 6, and 7 summarize corresponding typical data
for newer plants with significantly improved operating
characteristics. Similar site specific data are included in
References [1] through [6]. The careful selection of variables
used to define the HTS component aging, allows analysis
code based HTS component aging models to be generated
in terms of HTS component geometries, the SG and HTS
pump performance, and purification flow (References [7]).
During the design stages, HTS models are generated
from the known HTS component geometry and perfor-
mance, as supplied by the component manufacturers. An
analysis of the aging trends is generally limited to best-
estimate PT diametral creep predictions (References [8])
although conservative estimates may be used for the SG,
reactor core feeder roughness, and inlet feeder flow-reducing
pressure break-down orifice aging. 
As the HTS ages, the main tracked parameters of tem-
perature, pressure, coolant flow resistance (based on the
coolant flow rate), and core flow distribution may change
considerably over time. These four main tracked parameters
are affected by the aging of all HTS components. SG aging
not only reflects the inlet header temperature trend (Figs.
2 and 5) and SG flow resistance trend (Figs. 4 and 7), but
also the header to header differential pressure trend (Figs.
3 and 6), which, together with the core flow rate, defines
the reactor core hydraulic characteristics. Analyzing at
different historical times will allow the determination of
trends associated with the reactor HTS component aging.
These trends can then in turn be used to predict the best
estimate HTS operating conditions at future operating
points, forming the bases for safety analyses at specific
future reactor operating points.
Depending on the application requirements, the HTS
component model evaluations may have considerable detail.
The SG modelling may be used to predict the performance
of the SG for the given geometrical and thermal-hydraulic
characteristics or determine the parametric curves that
define the relationships between the inner tube diameter,
Fig. 3. Typical Header-to-Header Differential Pressure Trends
of a CANDU Plant
Fig. 2. Typical Inlet Header Temperature History of a
CANDU Plant at Full Power
Fig. 4. Typical Relative Average Steam Generator Flow
Resistance of a CANDU Plant
Fig. 5. Inlet Header Temperature Trend for Improved
CANDU-6 Plants
tube roughness, tube fouling, tube plugging, divider plate
leakage, thermal plate leakage, recirculation ratio and
primary separator pressure drop. As the plant ages, the SG
exhibits aging signs in terms of these parameters. Conse-
quently, the inlet header temperature (Figs. 2 and 5)
increases mainly from two effects:
• Lower heat transfer coefficients in the SG tubes as
residual builds up; and 
• Divider plate leakage which leads the coolant flow
to by-pass the SG tubes.
These two effects are overcome by SG cleaning and SG
divider plate replacement respectively. Correspondingly,
the inlet header temperature drops as noted in Fig. 2. Inlet
header temperature may also drop due to secondary side
SG setpoint pressure decrease, an operational option, as
shown in Fig. 2 as well.
Hydraulic or flow resistance is a property representative
of the physical geometry of the system at hand. Figs. 4
and 7 demonstrate a typical SG flow resistance. In these
particular situations, even though the residual build up is
expected to increase as the plant ages, the SG flow resistance
is noted to be relatively constant. This can be an indication
that there is no significant steady residual build-up in the
SG (Fig.7) or that the flow resistance increase from an
increased roughness in the SG tubes is compensated by a
flow resistance reduction owing to the SG divider plate
leakage (initial transient in Fig.4). Once the divider plates
are replaced with a non-leaking type, the flow resistance
increases as shown by the final transient in Fig. 4, specifi-
cally flow by-passing the SG tubes is eliminated or signifi-
cantly reduced. Similarly, once the SG tubes are cleaned, i.e.,
there is less residual build up, the flow passing through
the SG tubes increases owing to the lower flow resistance
in the SG. In both cases (SG divider plate is replaced or
the SG is cleaned), the flow resistance change expresses
a physical change in the SG.
Similar to the SG flow resistance defined in Figs. 4 and
7 a core pass flow resistance can be defined by
where ∆Phh is the header to header differential pressure
across the reactor core and Qhh is the pass flow rate. Con-
sidering Equation (1), for single phase flow conditions, the
flow resistance of the reactor core is practically unaffected
by SG hydraulic changes. Therefore, a decrease in flow from
a divider plate replacement will necessarily also decrease
the header-to-header differential pressure across the core,
and an increase in flow from SG cleaning will necessarily
increase the header-to-header differential pressure, as
observed in Fig. 3. It should be noted, as apparent in Fig. 3,
divider plate leakage and magnetite redistribution effects
appear to be about equal in magnitude but of opposite
direction. SG aging, therefore, directly affects the header
boundary conditions of the header-to-header differential
pressure (Fig. 3) as well as the inlet header temperature
(Fig. 2).
The aging behaviour of the below header geometry can,
in part, be expressed in terms of the header-to-header
differential pressure, as shown in Figs. 3 and 6. As the
plant ages, magnetite build up along the feeders is expected
to increase. Consequently, the header-to-header differential
pressure is also expected to increase, as shown in Fig. 3
(upper curve). However, it is noted that PT diametral creep
reduces the reactor core flow resistance, and consequently,
as per Equation (1), also tends to reduce the header to header
differential pressure, as shown in Figs. 3 and 6 as well.
4. PRESSURE TUBE DIAMETRAL CREEP EFFECTS
In an iterative process between the RC-1980 based
code (References [8]) and a HTS analysis code, a best-
estimate PT diametral creep profile of the pressure tube
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Fig. 6. Header to Header Differential Pressure Trend for
Improved CANDU-6 Plants
Fig. 7. Steam Generator Hydraulic Resistance Trend for
Improved CANDU-6 Plants
(1)
can be derived to reflect the aging of the pressure tubes
(References [7]). An appropriate, minor normalization will
then match the predictions to site-specific measurements yield-
ing average as well as upper-limit pressure tube diametral
creep, as shown in Fig. 8. For newer improved reactors
pressure tube diametral creep is evident in a decreasing
HTS core hydraulic resistance, as shown in Fig. 9. Since
pressure tube diametral creep is the highest in the central
core, where the fast neutron flux is the highest, the hydraulic
resistance will be lower in the central channels, and an
increasing radial flow tilt develops with age, as shown in
Fig. 10. Therefore, in addition to the below header hydraulic
resistance tracking the radial flow tilt tracking also becomes
important (References [6]).
5. EFFECT OF HTS AGING ON THE CANDU
SAFETY ANALYSIS
Aging of the primary heat transport system (PHTS)
components of a CANDU reactor may cause some changes
to the thermal-hydraulic characteristics, and these changes
can also affect the operational and safety margins of the
CANDU reactor. The primary aging phenomena include
pressure tube diametral creep, magnetite deposition, feeder
orifice degradation, and a fouling effect of the steam gen-
erator as mentioned earlier. 
A safety analysis methodology may involve statistical
or deterministic tools. Statistical analysis based method-
ologies generally take advantage of the low probability that
each uncertainty will affect the analysis outcome negatively,
and are, therefore, generally considered the most true and
realistic analyses. Such an analysis may have considerable
complexity. A deterministic analysis, in contrast, may
assume that all uncertainties will realize at most a negative
outcome. An analysis based on this assumption will neces-
sarily be conservatively bounding, in the sense that the
associated scenario is necessarily unlikely.
An improvement in the safety analysis is achieved by
not only improving the methodology but also by reducing
the uncertainties associated with the aging characteristics
of the reactor components. A reduction in uncertainties
may be achieved by better knowledge of the aging char-
acteristics of the reactor components in association with
well-defined maintenance procedures allowing more accu-
rate predictive capability of reactor performance. Further,
uncertainties may be reduced by an appropriate aging track-
ing and adjustment procedure, as described in References
[6] and [9]. This procedure places less emphasis on predic-
tion and more emphasis on tracking reducing uncertainties
and aging allowances. Improvements in the methodology
and reduction of uncertainties may lead to less restrictive
safety limits.
The aging behavior of the heat transport system (HTS)
for an older CANDU 6 plant as well as newer, improved
plants impacts the safety systems including the performance
of channel flows and Critical Channel Power (CCP), which
are major components in the Regional Overpower Protection
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Fig. 8. Typical Pressure Tube Diametral Creep of a CANDU
Plant
Fig. 10. Typical Radial Flow Tilt Trend for CANDU -6 Plants
Fig. 9. Below Header Hydraulic Resistance Trend for
Improved CANDU -6 Plants
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(ROP) system. This safety system protects against slow
Loss of Regulation (LOR) accidents. Here CCP is defined
as the channel power at which the fuel elements experience
intermittent dryout conditions (without fuel failure). The
margin to CCP can be tracked over time, and appropriate
corrective actions can be determined to ensure that adequate
margins continue to exist throughout the life of the station.
Reference [6] explores this application for a newer, im-
proved plant. Safety analyses based on CCP evaluations are
covered in detail in References [5], [6], and [7]. Therefore,
this section of the paper explores a post-CCP safety analysis
for aged reactors associated with a postulated feeder stagna-
tion break.
A recent safety analysis for the refurbished Wolsong 1
reactor considered the aging effect of the reactor by assum-
ing that the core is in the 11 EFPY (effective full power year)
state. Here, 11 EFPY means that the core is assumed to be
operated for 11 EFPY after the refurbishment of Wolsong 1.
From the site operation data and thermal-hydraulic analysis
results, the aging characteristics for the major components
of the PHTS of the 11 EFPY aged core were derived includ-
ing the roughness data of the feeder pipe, steam generator,
end-fitting and pressure tube, creep data for pressure tube,
orifice degradation, and steam generator fouling. 
To consider the HTS aging effect on the CANDU safety
analysis, this section shows the analysis approach for a
fresh core and an 11 EFPY core derived from the Wolsong
site operational data and used in the comparison of the safety
analysis results for a fresh core and an 11 EFPY aged core
in the case of a postulated feeder stagnation break. 
5.1 Aging Data Derived from Site Operational Data 
After the refurbishment of Wolsong 1, the pressure
tube diametral creep becomes zero as the pressure tubes
are being replaced. Therefore, no creep is considered at
the post refurbishment zero EFPY plant model. With the
installation of new feeders, the magnetite transport effect
is also eliminated for feeders and pressure tubes. This state
is called a “fresh core” after the refurbishment. 
To make the “aged core” model, which is assumed to
be operated 11 EFPY after the refurbishment, all aging
factors have to be considered simultaneously. Using the
linear interpolation between the reference model at zero
EFPY pre-refurbishment and the already existing average
tracked site data at 2000, i.e. 5270 EFPD, the desired 11
EFPY aging data can be created. It was recognized that not
all reactor component aging trends are linear, depending
on the material characteristics as well as the operational or
maintenance preferences. Therefore, appropriate uncertainty
and bias allowances have to be included in the aged model
to ensure the applicability of the analysis. A periodic verifi-
cation of the analysis assumption may also be required. 
The roughness increases as the operation proceeds,
but the orifice resistance generally degrades. The actual
aged data are considered in the safety analysis to verify
the aging effect on safety.
5.2 Comparison of Safety Analysis Results for the
Fresh and Aged Core 
To investigate the effect of component aging on safety,
a safety evaluation assesses both the fresh and aged core
states for a postulated feeder stagnation break accident. A
break in an inlet feeder can lead to a reduction in coolant
flow in the adjacent fuel channel with the channel remain-
ing under power. Depending on the break size, a complete
stagnation of the channel flow can occur, resulting in rapid
fuel and channel heat-up and channel failure. 
The safety analysis for the inlet feeder break is carried
out through two steps, the first of which is a thermal-
hydraulic evaluation, and the other is a fuel safety analysis,
as shown in Fig. 11.
5.2.1 Thermal-hydraulic Analysis
A thermal-hydraulic analysis was performed using
the average channel circuit model with a specific broken
channel for the CATHENA code [10]. The circuit model
was used to determine the system response to a break size.
The reactor inlet header conditions obtained from the
circuit simulations were used as boundary conditions for
analyzing the fuel and fuel channel behavior. Fig. 12
shows the circuit model of the broken pass for a circuit
analysis. The broken pass, as shown in Fig. 12, is repre-
sented by 7 multiple average channels (94 averaged) in
parallel with a single channel (the broken channel). The
single channel analysis was performed to examine the
channel thermal-hydraulic behavior. A single fuel channel
model for the limiting channel, as shown in Fig. 13, covers
a single channel from the inlet header to the outlet header
only. Herein, the limiting channel has the same geometry
as channel O6, but the channel power and bundle power of
the two center bundles have been modified to the licensing
limits of 7.3 MW and 935 kW, respectively. The transient
header boundary conditions of the pressure, vapor enthalpy,
liquid enthalpy, and void fraction generated from the circuit
simulations are provided for a single channel analysis.
Fig. 11. Overall Procedure of Safety Analysis for Feeder
Stagnation Break
Stagnation feeder breaks result in channel failure owing
to rapid fuel and channel heat up. The timing of channel
failure and the channel conditions at this time are a strong
function of the break size, a parametric survey for the break
size is performed using the single fuel channel analysis
for each aged and fresh cores. 
5.2.2 Fuel Safety Analysis
The objective of the fuel analysis for a feeder break
accident is to estimate the quantity and timing of the fission
product release from the fuel in the affected channel. The
amount and distribution of the fission products within the
fuel element play a major role in determining possible
radiation doses to the public after postulated accidents have
occurred. When a fuel sheath fails, the gap inventory of
fission products is released over a period of time as the
fission gases within the fuel element migrate towards the
defect site. The ELESTRES [11] code is used in the fuel
analysis to evaluate the fission product inventory and fuel
behavior under normal operating condition and provide
the initial transient coolant conditions. Gehl’s model [12]
is used to assess the amount of fission gas released from
the fuel during the transient period.
The fission product inventory results for the fresh and
aged cores for each isotope under normal operating condi-
tions may be compared. The distribution of the fission
product at the gap, grain boundary, and in-grain may differ
because the diffusion rate of the fission product is dependent
upon the fuel temperature. Although the total fission product
inventories (gap + grain boundary + in grain) are the same
for both aged and fresh cores, because the total inventory is
proportional to the element power, gap, and grain boundary
inventories, which are promptly released at the time of a
fuel failure, for the aged core may be higher than those
for the fresh core. 
To evaluate the amount of released fission gas more
conservatively, it may be assumed that all fuel sheaths in
the broken channel are failed and the entire gap inventory
is released instantaneously at the time of the accident. An
additional fission gas release during the transient from the
fuel grain and grain boundary is calculated by applying
Gehl’s release model [12]. The amount of released fission
gas is calculated until the time of fuel channel failure, which
is determined from the fuel channel T/H analysis. 
The results of a fission gas release for the fresh and
aged cores following the feeder stagnation break may be
compared. The number of considered fission gases is 30
including the isotopes of I, Kr and Xe, as shown in Table 1.
The initial release of the aged core may be higher because
of the prompt release of more gap inventory of the aged
core. The released fission gas abruptly increases at the time
of the channel failure. However, the final cumulative fission
gas release for the aged core may be higher by about 10%
when compared with the fresh core. The 11 EFPY aged
core may therefore be more conservative than the fresh
core from the fuel safety perspective.
6. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The aging of the primary heat transport system compo-
nents of CANDU reactor may cause changes to the thermal-
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Fig. 12. Circuit Model for Thermal-hydraulic Analysis
Fig. 13. Single Channel Model for Thermal-hydraulic
Analysis of Limiting Channel
CS-137
CS-138
I-131
I-132
I-133
I-134
I-135
I-137
KR-83M
KR-85M
KR-85
KR-87
KR-88
KR-89
RU-103
RU-106
SR-89
SR-90
TE-131M
TE-131
TE-132
TE-133M
TE-133
TE-135
XE-133M
XE-133
XE-135M
XE-135
XE-137
XE-138
Table 1. Fission Product Isotopes
hydraulic characteristics and these changes also affect
operational and safety margins of CANDU reactor. Thus,
in this work, the aging phenomena and its effect on the
thermal-hydraulic characteristics of CANDU 6 reactors was
explored and subsequent safety analyses ranging from the
assessment of safety limits associated with the prevention
of intermittent fuel sheath dryout and fission gas release
after fuel failure were summarized.
The followings are the main conclusions of this paper.
• Known aging processes of the CANDU heat transport
system, which would influence the Critical Channel
Power (CCP) and post-CCP safety assessment are the
increase of pressure tube diameter due to irradiation
creep, increase of hydraulic resistance due to redistri-
bution of iron oxides (magnetite), and erosion of the
edges of flow-reducing orifices.
• Improvement in safety analysis is achieved by improv-
ing the methodology and by reducing the uncertainties
associated with the component aging characteristics.
In order to reduce the uncertainties associated with the
aging, an appropriate aging tracking and adjustment
procedure is necessary, and this may lead to less
restrictive safety limits.
• Key measurable site parameters as a means of tracking
the aging of the CANDU heat transport system (HTS)
include temperature, pressure, coolant flow rate, and
core flow distribution. Analysing those key parameters
at different historical times will allow the determination
of HTS component aging trends, and these trends can
then in turn be used to predict the HTS operating
conditions at future operating points. 
• A specific safety assessment for stagnation feeder
breaks was carried out for both fresh and aged cores
in order to verify the aging effect on the post-CCP
safety analysis. From the comparison of the fission
gas release results, the aged core, which considers
the aging effect of HTS components, showed higher
fission gas release about 10% compared to that of the
fresh core. Thus, for a conservative safety assessment,
which is a basic characteristic of the deterministic
safety assessment, the HTS aging should be considered
in the safety analysis. Therefore, better understanding
of the component aging of CANDU reactor and more
accurate tracking methodology and aged model devel-
opment are necessary. 
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